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QUARANTINE REDUX:
BIOTERRORISM, AIDS AND THE
CURTAILMENT OF INDIVIDUAL
LIBERTY IN THE NAME OF PUBLIC
HEALTH
Wendy E. Parmett
Novel sources of death are especially frightening. In the early
1980s, the emergence of the AIDS epidemic was the source not only
of suffering and loss, but also of fear, hysteria, and irrationality. It
was in that heated climate that public debate turned to the questions of
when and whether government may infringe upon individual liberties
in order to protect public health.1
Although AIDS is still with us, and indeed it causes more suffer-
ing each year,2 in the United States it is no longer the public health
threat that induces the greatest fears. Bioterrorism may now claim
that honor. And so it now provokes the old debate pitting individual
liberties against the state.
The confluence of the terrorist attacks on the United States last
September and the anthrax mail attacks in the subsequent weeks fo-
cused attention and fear on the use of pathogens as weapons of mass
t Professor of Law, Northeastern University School of Law. Many thanks
to Anthony Robbins, M.D. and Anthony Moulton, Ph.D., for their comments on an
earlier version of the paper, to Daniel McCabe, Jennifer Hoenig, Jamie Quigley,
Kevin Pechulis, David Roberts and Jason Smith for their wonderful help researching
this paper, and to Jan McNew for her terrific secretarial assistance. All opinions and
errors are my own.
This paper was written in September 2002 and does not discuss develop-
ments in the field subsequent to that date.
1 The literature from that time is extensive. For a few examples, see
RONALD BAYER, PRIVATE ACTS, SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES: AIDS AND THE POLITICS OF
PUBLIC HEALTH (1989); see also Scott Burris, Fear Itself- AIDS, Herpes, and Public
Health Decisions, 3 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 479 (1985) (discussing the role of health
law as related to individual rights against the public good).
2 The Report on the Global HIV/AIDS Epidemic: The Barcelona Report,
UNAIDS, XIV International Conference on AIDS (July 2002) (reporting the latest
global HIV/AIDS statistics and putting forth new suggestions on how to better deal
with the crisis), available at http://www.unaids.org/barcelona/presskit/report.html.
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destruction. In response, the Centers for Disease Control and Preven-
tion ("CDC"), in collaboration with the National Governors Associa-
tion, the National Conference on State Legislatures, the Association of
State and Territorial Health Officials and the National Association of
County and City Health Officials commissioned the center for Law
and the Public's Health at Georgetown and Johns Hopkins Universi-
ties ("the Center") to develop a model act for states to consider enact-
ing in preparation for bioterrorism. In November 2001, the Center
released a draft version of the "Model State Emergency Health Pow-
ers Act" ("Model Act") which was revised in December. 3  Many
states are now considering legislation based upon the Model Act. 4
Although the two versions of the Model Act differ significantly in
many ways, both would grant governors the ability to declare a public
health emergency which would then permit the imposition of isola-
tion, quarantine, mandatory medical examinations, and other coercive
measures. 5 In effect, both versions of the Model Act grant states co-
ercive powers in order to meet the threat of bioterrorism. At the same
time, the Model Act's authors attempt to mediate the perceived clash
between the use of the coercive powers and individual rights. The
preamble states that
the Act recognizes that a state's ability to respond to a public
health emergency must respect the dignity and rights of per-
sons .... The Act thus provides that, in the event of the ex-
ercise of emergency powers, the civil rights, liberties, and
needs of infected or exposed persons will be protected to the
fullest extent possible consistent with the primary goal of con-
trolling serious health threats.6
As Yogi Berra has been quoted as saying, "It's d6jd vu all over
again!" As in the early years of the HIV epidemic, public health ap-
pears to be in conflict with the rights of the individual. In the case of
HIV, many have argued that "exceptional" policies prevailed and that
3 THE MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS ACT (Center for Law and
the Public Health at Georgetown and John Hopkins Universities, Draft for Discussion
2001), at http://www.publichealthlaw.net/msehpa/msehpa2.pdf (Dec. 21, 2001)
[hereinafter MODEL ACT].
4 See The Model State Emergency Health Powers Act: State Legislative
Activity (as of Oct. 1, 2002) (compiling all 50 states activity relating to the Model
State Emergency Health Powers Act), available at
http://www.pubichealthlaw.net/MSEHPALegActivity_050102.pdf.
5 See text accompanying notes 27-54, infra.6 MODEL ACT, supra note 3, at Preamble.
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protection of the public health gave way to individual rights.7 This
time around, with a new, perhaps even scarier threat, the outcome
should be different, or so the proponents of the Model Act would pro-
claim. But have we learned the right lessons?
In this Article, I review a revised version of the Model Act in light
of public health law's encounter with HIV. I begin in Part I by re-
viewing the Model Act and other legal responses that have been
adopted or proposed with respect to bioterrorism. In Part II, I discuss
the debates that emerged in the 1980s and early 1990s about individ-
ual rights in the wake of HIV. I suggest that although the government
did not by and large adopt coercive policies with respect to HIV, a
consensus developed, at least among policymakers and influential
public health theorists, that HIV was treated exceptionally, and that
the "normal" approach to public health threats is to invoke "traditional
police powers" that allow for placing restraints upon individual lib-
erty. 8 In Part III, I question that consensus, arguing that "traditional
police powers" are far more varied than is often appreciated. In par-
ticular, I discuss the important role that social and structural reforms,
as well as education, have long played in the protection of public
health. Restraint on individual liberty, I contend, has been a far less
critical part of public health's legal palate than is commonly assumed.
In Part IV, I turn to the role of law and legal procedures in mediating
the rights of the individual and the interests of the state in the face of
public health threats. Here I caution against excessive confidence in
modem statutes and judicial review as arbiters of the tensions that
exist between individuals and public health. Although courts played a
vital role in protecting individual rights during the AIDS epidemic, I
question whether they can or will do so during the next public health
emergency. Finally in Part VI return to bioterrorism I also suggest
that our legal preparations for bioterrorism should not rely too heavily
on laws pertaining to individual restraints and rights. Such an ap-
proach may lull political leaders and others into thinking they have
solved a problem when they have not. Rather than rely unduly on
constraints upon individuals, we must look to other more complex and
perhaps more expensive legal approaches that may help not only to
7 See Ronald Bayer, Public Health Policy and the AIDS Epidemic: An End
to HIV Exceptionalism? 324 NEW. ENG. J. MED. 1500 (1991) (arguing that the public
health response to AIDS has differed from responses to other diseases, but that this
different response is deteriorating).
8 More coercive policies have been adopted than is commonly appreciated.
See Scott Burris, Public Health, "AIDS Exceptionalism," and the Law, 27 J.
MARSHALL L. REv. 251, 253 (1994) (noting the governmental activity designed to
curb the spread of HIV). See also text accompanying notes 62-67 infra.
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prevent and contain bioterrorism, but to preserve individual interests
in the event of a misuse of governmental powers.
I. LEGAL RESPONSES TO BIOTERRORISM
Since ancient times, human beings have been known to use dis-
ease to injure their enemies.9 During the middle ages, soldiers threw
the bodies of plague victims over the walls of enemy cities.l° During
the French and Indian Wars, the English gave blankets exposed to
smallpox to enemy Indian troops."
Legal responses to biological warfare and bioterrorism are more
recent. 12 In 1925 the Geneva Protocol banned the use of biological
weapons in war by its signatories13 (although the United States signed
the Protocol in 1925, it did not ratify the treaty until 1975).14 In 1972
the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention banned the develop-
ment, production and stockpiling of biological weapons. 15 As part of
its implementation of the Convention, in 1989 Congress passed the
Biological Weapons Anti-Terrorism Act, 16 which criminalized the
possession or use of biological weapons. In 1996 the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act filled some of the gaps left by the
1989 Act by strengthening its criminal provisions and tightening the
regulation of the transfer and shipment of potentially hazardous bio-
logical material. 17 In addition, Congress turned its attention to bioter-
rorism once again in 2000, empowering the Secretary of Health and
Human Services to make grants and enter into contracts to respond to
9 See JUDITH MILLER ET AL., GERMS: BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS AND AMERICA'S
SECRET WAR, 37-38 (2001) (explaining several uses of disease to harm opponents
during warfare throughout history).
10 Id.
"1 Id. at 38.
12 For the purposes of this article, I will rely upon the term "bioterrorism" to
refer to any intentional use of a pathogen or biological toxin to harm or kill a human
being. The distinction between biological warfare, use of biological weapons to
commit an "ordinary crime," and bioterrorism, are subject to debate and not relevant
for this purposes of this discussion.
13 Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating Poisonous
or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925, 26 U.S.T.
571, 94 L.N.T.S. 65, 67 [hereinafter Geneva Protocol.]
14 Geneva Protocol, supra note 13, at 26 U.S.T. at 571-72.
15 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stock-
piling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction,
Apr. 10, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 583, 1015 U.N.T.S. 163.
16 18 U.S.C. §§ 175-78 (2002).
17 Id. at § 175(b).
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a public health emergency and establishing a workgroup on bioterror-
ism.18
Nevertheless as concerns about terrorism and bioterrorism intensi-
fied in the 1990s, 9 commentators increasingly pointed to deficiencies
in U.S. law as part of the problem. For example, in March 2001, Juli-
ette N. Kayyem, Executive Director of the Executive Session on Do-
mestic preparedness at the John F. Kennedy School of Government,
surveyed U.S. laws that applied to bioterrorism and concluded that
"[t]here needs to be a clearer understanding of what the rules are. The
law is not, and should not be, an impediment to protecting life. 20
Likewise in a September 2001 article, undoubtedly written before the
September 11 attacks, Professor David P. Fidler wrote that "the
American legal system is simply not designed to deal with such a
complex and insidious act of violence., 2
1
It was in response to the urgency created by September 11 and the
anthrax attacks, as well as the perception that inadequate laws under-
mined the nation's ability to respond to bioterrorism that the CDC
commissioned the Center to draft the Model Act. According to Secre-
tary of Health and Human Services Tommy Tompson, "[w]e need[ed]
not only a strong health infrastructure and a full stockpile of medical
resources, but also the legal and emergency tools to help our citizens
quickly. '22  The Model Act's chief drafter, Professor Lawrence 0.
Gostin concurred saying that the act was needed because "[c]urrent
public health laws are too highly antiquated and inadequate to ensure
18 See Public Health Threats and Emergencies Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. §
247(a) (2000) (referring to the powers of the Secretary of Health and Human Services
in an emergency).
'9 Many factors help explain the increasing salience of bioterrorism in the
1990s. These include the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center, the discovery of
the massive bioweapons program run by the Soviet Union, as well as the program run
by Iraq, and the discovery that the Japanese cult, Aum Shunrikyo experimented with
biological weapons before using sain gas to attack to the Tokyo subway system. For
a full discussion of these and other events, see MILLER ET AL., supra note 9.
20 Juliette N. Kayyem, U.S. Preparation for Biological Terrorism: Legal
Limitations and the Need for Planning, BCSIA Discussion Paper 2001-4, ESDP Dis-
cussion Paper ESDP-2000-02, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard
University, March 2001 (analyzing current laws and their ability to also cover terror-
istic acts), available at
http://ksgnotes 1.harvard.edu/BCSIA/Library.nsf/pubs/200IESDP2.
, David P. Fidler, The Malevolent Use of Microbes and the Rule of Law:
Legal Challenges Presented by Bioterrorism, 33 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS
DISEASES 686 (2001) (explaining how bioterrorism could have a negative effect on
the rule of law in the United States), .pdf file available at
http://www.joumals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/contents/v33n5.text.htm.
22 Justin Gillis, States Weighing Laws to Fight Bioterrorism, WASH. POST,
Nov. 19, 2001, at A- 1.
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a strong and effective response to bioterrorism . . . [Public health
laws] tend to be highly inadequate, confusing and contradictory -
even within states there's an inconsistent response. 23
In response to this perceived need, the Model Act seeks first and
foremost to clarify and rationalize public health law. In the tradition
of the uniform law movement, 24 the drafters and their sponsors sought
to provide states with a model act that would put in one place all state
laws pertaining to public health emergencies. 25 And, the Act sought
to ensure that states would have sufficient "authority" to deal with the
threat of bioterrorism. As the Model Act's findings state, "govern-
ment must do more to protect the health, safety, and general well be-
ing of its citizens.,
26
The key provisions in the Act for providing the state with the au-
thority to "do more" are found in Articles III, IV, and V, which enable
the Governor to declare a "state of public health emergency,, 27 thereby
triggering "special powers. 28 Under the Model Act, the Governor
23 Matt Mientka, CDC Releases Model Bioterroism Law, U.S. MEDICINE
INFORMATION CENTER (Dec. 2001), at
http://www.usmedicine.com/article.cfm?articlelD=314&issuelD=33 (last visited Oct.
24, 2002) See generally, James G. Hodge, Jr., Bioterrorism Law and Policy: Critical
Choices in Public Health, 30 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 254 (2002) (explaining need for
uniform collaborative effort between state, local and federal government organiza-
tions to protect the public from bioterrorism); Lorena Matei, Quarantine Revision and
the Model State Emergency Health Powers Act: "Laws for the Common Good," 18
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 433 (2002) (arguing for implementation
of a comprehensive law to protect citizens from bioterrorism).
See Lawrence 0. Gostin et al., The Model State Emergency Health Powers
Act: Planning for and Response to Bioterrorism and Naturally Occurring Infectious
Diseases, 288 JAMA 622, 625-26 (2002). The sponsors of the Act did note that the
Model Act was just a model, that each state should use it as a template for discussion
and review of their own laws, and that it was appropriate for states to make individual
adjustments. Nevertheless, the sponsors have pointed to the advantages of consis-
tency across state boundaries. See also George J. Annas, Bioterrorism, Public
Health, and Civil Liberties, 346 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1337, 1341 (Apr. 25, 2002) (ex-
plaining the need for new public health legislation relating to bioterrorism and how
the Model State Emergency Health Act will not suffice). Given the ability of bioter-
rorism to cross state boundaries, the viability of relying upon state as opposed to
federal laws is questionable.
26 MODEL ACT, supra, note 3, at § 102(a).
27 Id. at § 401.
28 Id. at § 403(a), Article V. The Model Act also has provisions that apply
prior to an emergency. For example, Article II of the Act requires the Governor to
appoint a commission charged with developing a "public health emergency plan." Id.
at §§ 201, 202 (emphasis omitted). The Act, however, does not require the state to
actually implement any elements of the plan. In addition, Article 1I of the Act re-
quires health care providers, coroners, and medical examiners to report "any illness or
[Vol. 13:85
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may declare a "state of public health emergency" upon the occurrence
of an
imminent threat of an illness or health condition that:
(1) is believed to be caused by any of the following:
(i) bioterrorism;
(ii) the appearance of a novel or previously controlled or
eradicated infectious agent or biological toxin;
(iii) [a natural disaster;]
(iv)[a chemical attack or accidental release; or]
(v) [a nuclear attack or accident]; and
(2) poses a high probability of any of the following harms:
(i) a large number of deaths in the affected population;
(ii) a large number of serious or long-term disabilities in
the affected population; or
(iii) widespread exposure to an infectious or toxic agent
that poses a significant risk of substantial future harm to a
large number of people in the affected population.29
Importantly, the Governor may declare such a state even "without
consulting with the public health authority or other experts when the
situation calls for prompt and timely action., 30  Once declared the
state of emergency may continue for thirty days, whereupon the Gov-
ernor (presumably again without consulting with anyone) may renew
the declaration for another thirty days. 3' This process apparently can
continue ad infinitum although at any time the legislature may termi-
health condition that may be potential causes of a public health emergency." Id. at §
301 (a). Pharmacists are also required to "report any unusual or increased prescription
rates, unusual types of prescriptions, or unusual trends in pharmacy visits that may be
potential causes of a public health emergency." Id. at § 301 (b). But see Annas, supra
note 25, at 1340 (criticizing what the Model Act actually requires and the potential
privacy implications of the requirement). The uncertainty as to what that actually
requires, and the potential privacy implications of the requirement, have elicited sig-
nificant criticism.
29 MODEL ACT, supra note 3, at § 104(m) (emphasis omitted). The sections
in brackets are meant to offer states the choice to expand the category of public health
emergencies beyond bioterrorism, if they desire. See Letter of Lawrence 0. Gostin,
December 21, 2001 (on file with author).
30 MODEL ACT, supra note 3, at § 401.
" Id. at § 405(b).
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nate the declaration if it finds that the "illness or health condition that
caused the emergency does not or no longer poses a high probability
of a large number of deaths in the affected population, a large number
of incidents of serious permanent or long-term disability in the af-
fected population, or a significant risk of substantial future harm to a
large number of people in the affected population., 32 Hence a state of
emergency can continue without any legislative affirmation indefi-
nitely unless a majority of the legislature votes to repeal it.33
Once a declaration is made, the Model Act gives the Governor
and the public health agency extraordinary powers.34 Briefly, the dec-
laration gives the Governor authority to "[s]uspend the provisions of
any regulatory statute prescribing procedures for conducting State
business, or the orders, rules and regulations of any State agency, to
the extent that strict compliance with the same would prevent, hinder,
or delay necessary action . . . by the public health authority." 35 It
would also permit the Governor to mobilize the militia into service.3 6
In addition, the public health authority would be authorized to close or
decontaminate facilities,37 to require health care facilities to provide
services, 38 and to require other facilities (the nature of which is unde-
fined) to provide a wide variety of services to the state. 39
32 Id. at §§ 405(b), (c). It is an interesting question whether such a legislative
veto is constitutional under all state constitutions. Cf., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919
(1983) (holding that federal legislative veto violates U.S. Constitution).
33 The Model Act is unclear as to whether the declaration or its repeal is
reviewable by a court. Although the Act provides for immunity for the state and its
officials for injuries or damages caused by the declaration (except when there is gross
negligence or willful misconduct), it says absolutely nothing about reviewability and
the possibility of prospective injunctive relief. Presumably many state courts would
find that they have the power to review such orders. Indeed, they may find that the
denial of any possibility of review raises grave questions under the due process clause
of the 14th amendment as well as state constitutional provisions guaranteeing access
to the courts. See, e.g., Heather Brann, Utah's Medical Malpractice Prelitigation
Panel: Exploring State Constitutional Arguments Against a Nonbinding Inadmissible
Procedure, 2000 UTAH L. REV. 359, 365-67 (2001) (applying due process clause and
state open courts provision to pre-litigation panels in medical malpractice cases).
34 See Annas, supra note 25, at 1338, 1340. See also Jennifer King, Power
Grab: The States in a State of Emergency. The Model Emergency Health Powers
Act, American Legislative Exchange Council Issue Analysis (Jan. 2002) (discussing
the key points of the Model Emergency Health Powers Act), at
http://www.alec.org/meSWFiles/pdf/O202.pdf.
35 MODEL ACT, supra note 3, at § 403(a)(1).
36 Id. at § 403(a)(4).
17 Id. at § 501(a).
31 Id. at § 502(b).
39 See id. at §§ 503(b), (c) (noting that the services must be "reasonable and
necessary to respond to the public health emergency").
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The most interesting provisions, however, authorize the state to
exert broad coercive powers over individuals, once a declaration of
emergency has been made. First, the public health authority may per-
form physical examinations and/or tests "necessary for the diagnosis
or treatment of individuals. ' 4° Because the Model Act does not spec-
ify what types of tests may be performed, or whether the examinations
need to have anything to do with the health threat instigating the dec-
laration, a state of emergency would presumably authorize the public
health authority to perform almost any diagnostic test on anyone.
Thus a public health authority acting in bad faith would have the law-
ful authority to use a public health threat as an excuse to perform
mandatory HIV tests! Under the Act, an individual's refusal to permit
this examination might justify isolation if the authority was uncertain
if the individual was infected.4'
Once a public health emergency has been declared, the public
health authority would also have the power to vaccinate and treat in-
dividuals.42 Individuals who are "unable or unwilling" to submit to
these procedures "for reasons of health, religion, or conscience" may
be subject to isolation and quarantine.43 What happens to people who
refuse to submit for other reasons (such as suspicion of public authori-
ties) is not made clear.
The isolation and quarantine provisions are undoubtedly among
the most central in the act.44 Under the Model Act, isolation and/or
40 MODEL ACT, supra note 3, at § 602.
41 Id. at § 602(c). Although the Act would seem to permit the public health
authority to conduct almost any kind of diagnostic test or examination, quarantine or
isolation is only permitted if there is uncertainty as to whether the individual has been
exposed to a contagious disease. Id. Generally, a contagious disease is one that can
be transmitted by casual contact. See MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY
249 (10 th ed. 1998). However, the Act defines a contagious disease more broadly to
include any "infectious disease that can be transmitted from person to person."
MODEL ACT, supra note 3, at § 104 (c). Hence while HIV is not typically considered
a "contagious disease," it would appear to be so within the literal meaning of the Act.
2 Id. at § 603.
41 Id. §§ 603(a)(3), (b)(3).
44 Isolation, as the term is defined by the Model Act
[I]s the physical separation and confinement of an individual or groups of
individuals who are Infected or reasonably believed to be infected with a
contagious or possibly contagious disease from non-isolated individuals, to
prevent or limit the transmission of the disease to non-isolated individuals.
Id. at § 104(h).
Furthermore, the Model Act defines "quarantine" as:
The physical separation and confinement of an individual or groups of indi-
viduals, who are or may have been exposed to a contagious or possible con-
tagious disease and who do not show signs or symptoms of a contagious
20031
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quarantine is authorized when individuals refuse to submit to an ex-
amination, treatment or vaccination as discussed above, as well as
when they are "the least restrictive means necessary to prevent the
spread of a contagious or possibly contagious disease to others., 45
Again the Model Act does not require that the "contagious disease"
which is the object of the isolation or quarantine be the illness that
triggered the public health emergency in the first place. Thus the ap-
pearance of anthrax, a non-contagious bioterrorist agent, could theo-
retically trigger isolation for HIV or hepatitis if the public health au-
thority believed that it was the "least restrictive means necessary to
spread" the infection.
The Model Act relies heavily upon judicial procedures to oversee
and legitimate the use of isolation and quarantine. Within ten days of
subjecting an individual to isolation or quarantine, the public health
authority is required to file a petition to a court stating the reasons for
the order.46 Within five days of receiving the petition, a hearing must
be held, although "[i]n extraordinary circumstances and for good
cause" it may be postponed for up to 10 days, meaning that the indi-
vidual can be held for up to 20 days before any judicial review may
occur.
47 At the hearing, the court may grant the petition if "by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence, isolation or quarantine is shown to be
reasonably necessary to prevent or limit the transmission of a conta-
gious or possibly contagious disease to others. 4 8 An order approving
the isolation or quarantine may extend for thirty days, although the
court, upon motion, may extend it for another thirty days.49 An indi-
vidual may also be released upon successfully petitioning the court for
an order to show cause why the individual should not be released. °
For all hearings regarding an individual's isolation and quarantine, the
court must appoint counsel for the individual. 51 In appropriate cir-
cumstances, cases may be consolidated.5 2
Concerned about the human rights and dignity of those subject to
these orders, the Model Act requires the state to provide for the
disease, from non-quarantined individuals, to prevent or limit the transmis-
sion of the disease to non-quarantined individuals.
Id. at § 104(o).
45 MODEL ACT, supra note 3, at § 604(b)(1).
46 Id. at §§ 605(a)(4), (b)(2).
47 Id. at § 605(b)(4).
48 Id. at § 605(b)(5).
41 Id. at §§ 605(b)(5)(1), (b)(6).
50 MODEL ACT, supra note 3, at § 605(c)(1).
51 Id. at § 605(e)(1).
52 See id at § 605(e)(2) (listing the circumstances when consolidation is
proper).
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"needs" of individuals subject to the order, by providing them with at
least "adequate food, clothing, shelter, means of communication...
medication, and competent medical care."53 Interestingly, the Act
does not explicitly require the state to provide for the economic con-
sequences, such as loss of wages or unemployment, that an individual
may face due to an isolation or quarantine order, although this may
perhaps be included as part of an individual's "needs." Likewise, the
Act does not explicitly obligate the state to care for an affected indi-
vidual's dependants. Moreover, the stringent immunity provisions of
the Model Act would appear to foreclose the possibility of any dam-
age remedy for the state's failure to abide by some of those provi-
sions, as well as any compensation for any economic or other injuries
that may result from inappropriate or unnecessary isolation.54
II. "AIDS EXCEPTIONALISM"
It is not surprising that the advent of a frightening, seemingly new
public health menace has prompted consideration of coercive meas-
ures. Throughout history, new plagues have been met with restric-
tions upon individual liberties. Sometimes this has been because such
restrictions are the only or most effective way to preserve the commu-
nity given the circumstances. Too often, however, the reliance on
coercion has been unnecessary and ineffective and in hindsight can be
recognized as nothing more noble than the scapegoating, if not vilifi-
cation of marginalized groups.55 So it was with AIDS.
The arrival of a deadly and terrifying new disease, transmitted
sexually, and associated in the public's mind with homosexuals elic-
ited cries to remove, isolate, and even brand those who were in-
fected.56 Today we may forget that in the 1980s HIV positive school
children were commonly cast out of their classroom, but such was the
state of fear when Ryan White became a well-recognized name.57
Indeed, surveying the state of public opinion in 1987, Professor
Gostin along with his co-author Andrew Ziegler wrote that
" Id. at § 604(b)(6).
14 Id. at § 804(a).
55 Wendy E. Parmet, AIDS and Quarantine: The Revival of an Archaic
Doctrine, 14 HOFSTRA L. REv. 53, 55-58 (1985); Guenter B. Risse, Epidemics and
History: Ecological Perspectives and Social Responses, in AIDS: THE BURDENS OF
HISTORY 33 (Elizabeth Fee and Daniel M. Fox eds., 1988).
56 Parmet, supra note 55, at 53-54.
57 See Wendy E. Parmet & Daniel J. Jackson, No Longer Disabled: The
Legal Impact of the New Social Construction of HIV, 23 AM. J.L. & MED.7, 10 (1997)
(discussing Ryan White's plight against discrimination based on his HIV positive
status).
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There is some public support for restricting the liberty and
autonomy of HIV-infected people. In five national public
opinion polls conducted between September 1985 and No-
vember 1986, 28 to 54 percent of the respondents favored
'quarantine' of people with AIDS in 'special places to keep
them away from the general public.'
58
They then went on to discuss the various proposals taken up by state
legislatures to increase state authority to confine HIV positive indi-
viduals.
59
Perhaps the most serious and difficult debate about the use of co-
ercive powers and HIV concerned the use of wide-scale mandatory
testing.60 For many reasons, this was never implemented. No doubt,
the timing of the HIV epidemic played some role in the initial rejec-
tion of mandatory testing. Arriving after the Civil Rights movements,
Watergate, the birth of the gay rights movement and even the revela-
tions about the Tuskegee experiments, HIV made its appearance at a
time when the public was especially sensitive to claims of individual
rights and particularly skeptical of government authority. But even
more important than the zeitgeist, perhaps, was the reality that given
the fact that HIV was transmitted by private behaviors, and that an
individual remained infectious throughout his or her life, it was diffi-
cult to see how mandatory testing could aid efforts to thwart the dis-
ease's spread. Rather, by the late 1980s most public health officials
had come to believe that the trust of those infected and the coopera-
tion of communities at risk was key to protecting the public against
HIV, and both of these could and would be undermined by the impo-
sition of coercive measures. As Professor Samuel Bagenstos has writ-
ten,
when public health officials forewent coercive measures in
their responses to AIDS, their position reflected less a capture
by an important interest group than a hardhearted calculation
that an epidemic spread by the intimate conduct of particular
segments of the community simply could not be brought un-
58 Larry Gostin & Andrew Ziegler, A Review of AIDS-Related Legislative
and Regulatory Policy in the United States, 15 LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 5, 11
(1987).
59 See id (noting that at the time some states had already enacted HIV isola-
tion policies, while others were still considering it).
60 For an early discussion of the issue, see Michael L. Closen et. al, AIDS.
Testing Democracy - Irrational Responses to the Public Health Crises and the Need
for Privacy in Serologic Testing, 19 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 836 (1986).
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der control by measures that failed to pay attention to the in-
terests of those segments of the community.
61
Although by the late 1980s, a broad consensus had rejected the
use of broad-scale mandatory testing and a variety of other coercive
measures (such as the exclusion of children from schools), the debate
62
continued about the more limited application of coercive powers.
For example, in 1991 Dr. Marcia Angell editorialized in the New Eng-
land Journal of Medicine for the mandatory screening of pregnant
women and infants.63 Writing in the same issue, Ronald Bayer, also
counseled for the reconsideration of more "traditional" public health
powers. 64 Arguing that HIV had been treated "exceptionally," Bayer
wrote:
In the first years of the AIDS epidemic, U.S. officials had no
alternative but to negotiate the course of AIDS policy with
representatives of a well-organized gay community and their
allies in the medical and political establishments. In this
process, many of the traditional practices of public health that
might have been brought to bear were dismissed as inappro-
priate. As the first decade of the epidemic came to an end,
public health officials began to reassert their professional
dominance over the policy-making process and in so doing
began to rediscover the relevance of their own professional
traditions to the control of AIDS.65
61 Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Americans with Disabilities Act as Risk Regula-
tion, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1479, 1503 (2001).
62 The debate has also never ended as to whether HIV status alone should be
a reportable disease. For a discussion of this issue, see Lawrence 0. Gostin & James
G. Hodge, Jr., The "Names Debate": The Case for National HIV Reporting in the
United States, 61 ALB. L. REV. 679 (1998).
63 Marcia Angell, A Dual Approach to the AIDS Epidemic, 324 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 1498, 1499-1500 (1991). The question of whether pregnant women or new-
bors should be subject to mandatory testing has never gone away. Although the
CDC formulated a policy calling for routine counseling and voluntary testing of all
pregnant women, FY 1995 Epidemiologic Research Studies of Acquired Immunode-
ficiency Syndrome (AIDS) and Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) Infection, 60
Fed. Reg. 35405, 35406 (July 7, 1995), New York State passed the nation's only law
requiring testing of newborns. N.Y. PUBLIC HEALTH LAW § 2500-f (McKinney 2002).
For more on the current debate, see Leslie Ayers, Note,-Is Mama a Criminal?-An
Analysis of Potential Criminal Liability of HIV-Infected Pregnant Women in the Con-
text of Mandated Drug Therapy, 50 DRAKE L. REV. 293, 297-98 (2002).
64 Bayer, supra note 7, at 1502-04.
65 Id. at 1502-04. The claim that political necessity led to the rejection of
traditional public health approaches in the early years of the H1V epidemic also ap-
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Bayer and Angell were not alone. Lee Reichman, director of the Na-
tional Tuberculosis Center, stated "[t]raditional public health is abso-
lutely effective at controlling infectious disease. It should have been
applied to AIDS from the start, and it wasn't. Long before there was
AIDS, there were other sexually transmitted diseases, and you had
partner notification and testing and reporting. This was routine public
health at its finest.,
66
Although some commentators at the time questioned the "AIDS
exceptionalism" thesis, 67 by the mid-to-late 1990s many scholars and
public health officials had begun to question the rejection of coercive
measures vis-a -vis HIV. 68 Thus when multi-drug resistant tuberculo-
sis appeared in New York in the early 1990s, many experts concurred
on the need to institute mandatory treatment and isolation (as well as
directly observed therapy).69 The efficacy of those methods in the
"war" against MDR-TB seemed to vindicate the exceptionalist thesis
which premised the importance of restricting individual liberties in the
name of public health.70
The legal corollary to the exceptionalism thesis was that the po-
lice power provided states with the authority to restrict individual lib-
erty in the name of public health. Just as the HIV exceptionalists be-
lieved that restrictions on individual liberty were key to public
health's ability to control communicable diseases, public health schol-
ars viewed liberty-restraining regulations as the sine qua non of public
health law. In 1999 Professor Gostin along with his colleagues Pro-
fessors Burris and Lazzarini wrote: "A reliance on coercive reactive
pears in Bayer, supra note 1, at 21.
66 Chandler Burr, The AIDS Exception: Privacy v. Public Health, THE
ATLANTIC MONTHLY, June 1997, at 57, 66.
67 See Burris, supra note 8, at 252 (noting that AIDS exceptionalism "never
quite existed").
68 See Burr, supra note 66 (providing examples of advocates for traditional,
coercive measures).
69 See Teri Flowers, Quarantining the Noncompliant TB Patient: Catching
the "Red Snapper," 28 J. HEALTH & HosP. L. 95 (1995) (advocating quarantining of
tuberculosis patients); Patricia C. Kuszler, Balancing the Barriers: Exploiting and
Creating Incentives to Promote Development of a New Tuberculosis Treatment, 71
WASH. L. REV. 919, 930-37 (1996); Karen H. Rothenberg & Elizabeth C. Lovoy,
Something Old, Something New: The Challenge of Tuberculosis Control in the Age of
AIDS, 42 BUFF. L. REV. 715, 729-31 (1994) (discussing tuberculosis treatment and
experts' desire to institute mandatory isolation and treatment as done in the 19"h and
early 2 0 th centuries).
70 See Thomas R. Frieden et al., Tuberculosis in New York City - Turning
The Tide, 333 NEW ENG. J. MED. 229, 229-31 (1995) (illustrating the great success of
using directly observed therapy and treatment completion in controlling the spread of
tuberculosis).
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control methods - particularly nuisance abatement, quarantine, and
isolation - can be said to form the deepest layer of American disease
control law, a layer that is often invisible, but that still shapes the
structure of the statutory landscape., 71 Likewise in his 2000 opus,
Public Health Law: Power, Duty and Restraint, Professor Gostin
again noted the central role that coercion of individuals plays in public
health promotion, stating that "[t]he study of the coercive powers of
the state is a staple of what we call public health law. 72
Professor Gostin's appreciation of the states' coercive powers has
never been uncritical. Indeed, as far back as 1986 he criticized the
antiquated nature of many state laws, noting that they often fail to
reflect contemporary understandings of both epidemiology and consti-
tutional law." In 1999 he, along with Professors Lazzarini and Burris
wrote:
The most striking characteristic of state disease control law,
and the one that underlies most of its defects, is its overall an-
tiquity...
Certainly, old laws are not necessarily bad laws. A well-
written statute may remain useful, efficacious, and constitu-
tional for many decades. Nevertheless, old public health stat-
utes that have not been substantially altered since their enact-
ment are often outmoded in ways that directly reduce both
their efficacy and their conformity with modem standards.
These laws often do not reflect contemporary scientific under-
standings of disease, current treatments of choice, or constitu-
tional limits on states' authority to restrict individual liber-
ties.74
Thus long before the terrible events of the fall 2001, Professor
Gostin and many others had come to believe that despite prevailing
HIV-policies, the core to public health law was the states' coercive
powers. These powers, however, were seen as in serious need of up-
71 Lawrence 0. Gostin et al., The Law and the Public's Health: A Study of
Infectious Disease Law in the United States, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 59, 102 (1999).
72 LAWRENCE 0. GosTiN, PUBLIc HEALTH LAW: POWER, DUTY, RESTRAINT 19
(2000).
73 Lawrence 0. Gostin, The Future of Public Health Law, 12 AM. J.L. &
MED. 462, 463-71 (1986). See also William J. Curran, Mary E. Clarke & Larry
Gostin, AIDS: Legal and Policy Implications of the Application of Traditional Dis-
ease Control Measures, 15 LAW MED. & HEALTH CARE 27 (1987) (stating concerns
about traditional ways of handling diseases as applied to the AIDS epidemic).
74 Gostin et al., supra note 71, at 102-06 (citations omitted).
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dating. 7 But by revising them to reflect "modem" understandings of
disease and law, these scholars believed that states could more effec-
tively protect public health by restraining individuals while respecting
their legal rights. These three axioms that public health law is most
fundamentally about the restraint of individual liberties, that it re-
quires modernization, and that modernization can ensure the protec-
tion of individual rights while restraining those rights - animate the
Model Act. The question remains: how valid are these premises?
III. THE ROLE OF COERCIVE POWERS IN PUBLIC
HEALTH PROTECTION
There can be no doubt that the restraint of individuals, especially
via quarantine and isolation, has long played an important role in pub-
lic health law. During the middle ages, lepers were subject to isola-
tion throughout Europe.76 On these shores, quarantines against small-
pox were instituted as far back as 1622. 77
There can also be little doubt that courts have generally upheld the
use of isolation and quarantine for public health goals. 78 When com-
munities were threatened by devastating epidemics, judges were
loathe to question actions that were taken in the name of public
health. 79  Thus in the famous case of Jacobson v. Massachusetts,
which upheld a law requiring vaccination against smallpox, the Su-
preme Court of the United States said:
Upon the principle of self-defense, of paramount necessity, a
community has the right to protect itself against an epidemic
of disease which threatens the safety of its members ... [I]t is
equally true that in every well-ordered society charged with
the duty of conserving the safety of its members the rights of
the individual in respect of his liberty may at times, under the
pressure of great dangers, be subjected to such restraint, to be
75 See Gostin et al., supra note 25, at 623. The drafters of the Model Act
repeated that point in 2002. Echoing the 1999 article by Gostin, Lazzarini and Burris,
they wrote, "[S]tate public health statutes frequently are outdated and were built up in
layers during the 20t century in response to each new disease threat. Consequently,
these laws often do not reflect contemporary scientific understandings of disease (e.g.,
surveillance, prevention, and response) or legal norms for protection of individual
rights."
76 Parmet, supra note 55, at 55.
7 Id. at 56.
78 Id. at 59-66.
79 Id. at 64-69. However, U.S. judges often did engage in a limited form of
review, determining whether public health authorities had exceeded the scope of their
authority and had not acted arbitrarily and without reason. See id
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enforced by reasonable regulations, as the safety of the gen-
eral public may demand.80
The ubiquity and legality of quarantine and isolation, however, do
not in themselves establish that they have been or ought to be seen as
the core to public health law in general or central to our efforts to con-
front bioterrorism or many emerging threats. 8' With respect to his-
tory, the focus on isolation and quarantine of individuals overlooks
the fact that historically quarantines were probably more often insti-
tuted against cargo vessels than against individuals. 82 Indeed, in U.S.
constitutional law, the police power doctrine developed significantly
in contests over the government's ability to regulate commerce.83 In
the 1 9 th century it was often business interests, not advocates for indi-
vidual rights, who challenged the authority of public health boards.84
These points are salient not because they question the ability of
government to restrain the liberty of individuals, but because they
should remind us that public health, in practice and in law, generally
has had as much or more to do with regulatory efforts to shape the
market than to restrain individuals. In the 1 91h century, after all, the
great early steps taken by public health focused on the supply of clean
water and wholesome foods.85  In these instances government re-
strained liberty, but it was not the personal liberty of individuals to
80 Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 27, 29 (1905).
81 For arguments that quarantine and isolation would likely be fairly useless
under most bioterrorism scenarios, see Joseph Barbera et al., Large-Scale Quarantine
Following Biological Terrorism in the United States, Scientific Examination, Logistic
and Legal Limits, and Possible Consequences, 286 JAMA 2711 (Dec. 2001).
82 See WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE'S WELFARE: LAW AND REGULATION
IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 204-05 (1996) (explaining the frequent use of
maritime quarantines on vessels arriving on American shores). See also Sylvia N.
Tesh, Miasma and "Social Factors" in Disease Causality: Lessons from the Nine-
teenth Century, 20 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 1001, 1005 (1995) (discussing how
quarantines not only interfered with commerce but he interest of the people).
83 Wendy E. Parmet, After September 11, Rethinking Public Health Federal-
ism 30 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 201, 202-03 (2002).
84 NOVAK, supra note 82, at 209. On the other hand, business interests also
sometimes favored public health regulations, for example a historian of food inspec-
tion laws claims that the livestock and packing industries pressed for regulations so
that European countries would open their markets to American meat. VIVIAN WISER,
U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC, MEAT AND POULTRY INSPECTION IN THE UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE.
85 See GEORGE ROSEN, A HISTORY OF PUBLIC HEALTH 216-16 (expanded ed.,
The Johns Hopkins Univ. Press 1993) (1958) (discussing the causes of public health
reform in the 19ffi century). See also Wendy E. Parmet, From Slaughter-House to
Lochner: The Rise and Fall of the Constitutionalization of Public Health, 40 AM. J.
LEGAL HIST. 476, 489 (1996) (stating the importance of clean water and pure food).
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control their movement or make decisions about their own health care
and bodily integrity; rather it was the liberty of businesses to sell un-
pasteurized milk or the liberty of taxpayers to avoid supporting a pub-
lic water supply.
Certainly as the germ theory and contagionism took hold and the
massive epidemics of the 1 91h century faded from memory, public
health practitioners were more apt to see an individual who carried an
infectious agent rather than filth or miasma as the source of danger.
Likewise, as clinical medicine became more efficacious and more
dominant, public health increasingly adopted its individualistic orien-
tation and came to believe that identifying patients and getting them to
treatment was central to its mission. 6 As a result, public health advo-
cates began to stress the virtue of contact tracing and isolation. 7 But
this vision of public health was never uncontested.88 Even in the hey-
day of the public health movement, some adherents stressed education
over coercion, arguing for the need to obtain a patient's cooperation.8 9
Other public health notables argued that public health had to focus
less on identifying and treating individuals and more on what we to-
day would call the social conditions for health. In 1904, for example,
Herman Biggs claimed that the time had come for public health to
emphasize the occupational conditions that give rise to morbidity. 90
Less than two decades later, C.E.A. Winslow, noted that while
"[s]anitation, isolation, vaccine and serum therapy, provided the com-
plete machinery necessary for controlling many of the acute commu-
nicable diseases; ... it became clear that the major problem of tuber-
culosis required other methods for its solution." 91 He described these
86 Parmet, supra note 85, at 491. Scott Burris has noted that the so-called
traditional public health powers have been used only infrequently and have "deep
roots in a medicalized approach to public health." Burris, supra note 8, at 257.
87 E.g., George H. Rohe, Recent Advances in Preventive Medicine, 9 JAMA
1, 10-11 (1887) (arguing that the first requirement for dealing with an infectious
disease from a "State Medicine Point of View" is notification and the second is segre-
gation. The third requirement according to Rohe was disinfection).
88 Burris, supra note 8, at 256 (noting that the process of identifying and
treating at-risk individuals had the effect of separating social reform from medical
treatment in the field of public health). See also, Barbara Gutmann Rosenkrantz, Cart
Before Horse: Theory, Practice and Professional Image in American Public Health,
1870-1920, J. HIST. MED. & ALLIED Sci. 55, 66-68 (1974) (discussing problems asso-
ciated with registration and tracing of tuberculosis patients as prevention of spreading
the disease).
89 See Rosenkrantz, supra note 88, at 63-64 (emphasizing the importance of
educating the public to increase health improvements and battle diseases).
Herman M. Biggs, Preventive Medicine: Its Achievements, Scope, and
Possibilities, 65 MED. RED, 956 (1904).
91 C.E.A. Winslow, The Evolution and Significance of the Modern Public
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methods as including the organization of sanatoriums and dispensa-
ries, the development of ambulatory care and home visits, and most
especially a campaign of public education.92 It might also include, he
suggested, the establishment of some system of health care financing
to permit the poor to pay for the kind of medical care that public
health advocated.93
In the twentieth century, the jurisdiction of public health frag-
mented. Many of the problems, and legal controls, that were once
within the purview of public health boards fell to other governmental
bodies, such as the Environmental Protection Agency, the Food and
Drug Administration and state agencies.94 Often, these agencies focus
on regulating large actors in the marketplace, not individuals. But that
does not mean that such agencies do not "do" public health. They do.
As a result, the claim that coercion of individuals is core to public
health is in part an artifact of the divestment of many public health
functions to other agencies.
All of this is not to deny a role, even a vital one, for the restriction
of individual liberty in times of public health crisis. But it is to ques-
tion the claims of the AIDS exceptionalists that such restraints are
core to public health powers. Rather, other forms of government ac-
tivity, including especially the regulation of goods and services and
the formation of government services, such as the provision of clean
water and the inspection of food supplies, are far more apt candidates
for the title of core public health powers (even if some of these activi-
ties are no longer carried out by boards of health).
This suggests that the assumption of the drafters of the Model Act
that updating and expanding the government's ability to coerce indi-
viduals is central to confronting bioterrorism may well be misplaced.
There is no evidence to conclude that public health in the past has
been most successful when it has relied primarily upon individual
coercion and there is little reason to believe that such a policy would
be the most effective approach were we faced with another bioterrorist
incident.95 Indeed, if history teaches us anything about the use of such
Health Campaign, J. PUB. HEALTH POL'Y, at 50 (3d printing 1984).
92 Id. at 52.
9' Id. at 61-62.
94 21 U.S.C. § 393 (2002); Reorg. Plan No. 3 of 1970, 35 Fed. Reg. 15623
(1970), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. app. 1 at 389 (1996). See ROSEN, supra note 85, at 215-
16 (discussing the establishment of voluntary health association to improve public
health); James G. Hodge, Jr. Implementing Modern Public Health Goals Through
Government: An Examination of New Federalism and Public Health Law, 14 J.
CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 93, 101-03 (1997).
95 Barbera et al., supra note 81, at 2713-14. This is not to question the ap-
propriateness of applying the coercive authority of the criminal law to the perpetrators
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"traditional powers" it is that they are often, especially in crises, mis-
used, sacrificing the rights of especially vulnerable individuals often
for little or no public health benefit. 96 Whether that might happen
under the Model Act depends, in large part, upon whether the drafters
are correct in assuming that a modem statute, incorporating contem-
porary legal standards, can prevent the abuses of public health author-
ity so common in history. It is to this question that I now turn.
IV. THE ROLE OF LAW IN PROTECTING
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS
A central tenet of the Model Act is that a modem, carefully
drafted statute, providing for current standards of due process can help
avoid the abuses of public health authority that have occurred in prior
epidemics. Two premises are implicit in this tenet. First, that a mod-
em statute will clarify ambiguity and prevent misuses of legal author-
ity.97 Second, that contemporary legal standards provide meaningful
protections against abuses of authority. Each deserves brief discus-
sion.
Responding to Professor Gostin's long-articulated belief that pub-
lic health statutes are in a shambles and badly in need of updating, the
Model Act seeks to resolve issues of authority and rights by providing
clear and contemporary language. But while Professor Gostin and
others have demonstrated by their review of state statutes that many
state public health laws are old and confusing, there is little evidence
to conclude that they have impeded public health protection. 98 More-
over, it is by no means clear that any new code could provide greater
clarity and legal certainty than do current statutes. Indeed, there are
many reasons to doubt that it could.
of bioterrorism. My focus here is on the application of coercion to victims of bioter-
ronsm.
96 For a discussion of how public health officials in San Francisco in the
early 1900s came to equate bubonic plague with race and as a result imposed a quar-
antine on Chinatown, see NAYAN SHAH, CONTAGIOUS DIVIDES: EPIDEMICS AND RACE
IN SAN FRANCISCO'S CHINATOWN 120-57 (2001).
97 See Gostin et al., supra note 25, at 623-24. The drafters also hope that a
modem statute will clarify the vigorous nature of authority, when it is needed.
98 For example, in a recent article on New York's initial response to the West
Nile Virus, Wilfredo Lopez, counsel for the Department of Health noted that "the
existing authority of the Board of Health, which in the abstract may seem vague or
ambiguous, is still sufficiently flexible, effective, and amazingly powerful when ap-
propriately applied to a particular situation." Wilfredo Lopez, West Nile Virus in New
York City 92 AMER. J. PuB. HEALTH 1218, 1221 (2002). According to Lopez, the
West Nile experience teaches the need for greater understanding of existing laws and
greater cooperation among agencies and professionals. Id.
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First, although the Model Act was drafted by luminaries in the
field, it has its own ambiguities. For example, as was noted above,
the Act is quite unclear about what treatments and tests may be re-
quired once a public health emergency is declared. 99 The Act's treat-
ment of individuals who refuse forced vaccinations for reasons other
than those provided for in the Act is also uncertain. 100 Nor are the
mandatory reporting requirements applicable to pharmacists crystal
clear in their meaning.'
0 1
These uncertainties are not pointed out as criticism of the drafters'
work. Instead, there is a significant reason to wonder whether any
new code can possibly foresee and resolve all of the issues that may
emerge if and when there is a major bioterrorist incident. Indeed,
precisely because the drafters are writing for the unthinkable, we may
well wonder whether they really can make it all that clear and certain.
To be sure, existing state public health laws do not deserve any
Strunk and White awards for clarity of prose. However, when we ask
"what is the law" we generally do not ask only what the statute says,
but also what the courts and administrative agencies have said about
it. Old laws therefore, have at least one virtue lacking in any new law:
there are often judicial and administrative interpretations (not to men-
tion shared practices and understandings that have guided agencies)
that resolve some of the ambiguities and fill in some of the drafters'
holes. Any new statute, precisely because it is new, lacks that annota-
tion and thus, in some significant sense, may be more prone to ambi-
guity than its predecessor. The Model Act's drafters have tried to
mitigate this problem by basing their language on some pre-existing
state laws and providing a legislative history to each section which
cites to those laws. Nevertheless, the lack of interpretative gloss may
be especially problematic because doctrines precluding advisory opin-
ions will make it difficult in many states to know precisely how states
will actually interpret specific provisions new to their states until an
emergency declaration is made, but that, of course, is precisely the
time for which the drafters hoped to provide certainty.!
0 2
" See MODEL ACT, supra note 3, at § 602 (noting that the Act only instructs
that the tests "must not be such as are reasonably likely to lead to serious harm to the
affected individual").
oo See id at § 603(b)(3) (listing only three reasons why individuals may not
be willing to submit to vaccination).
See id. at § 301(b) (listing when a pharmacist needs to report).
102 Some states do permit their courts to offer advisory opinions. This would
be especially useful, especially in states where there may be colorable claims that the
Model Act violates provisions of the state constitution. See PAUL M. BATOR ET AL.,
HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL PROCESS 70 (3d ed.
1988).
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Even if clarity can be obtained, however, the ability of any emer-
gency statute to prevent abuses is worth pondering. As Professor
Gostin and his colleagues have aptly stated:
The greatest risk to liberties may be that safeguards that are
adequate in principle will not be practically sufficient in the
face of the terror of an attack, that government officials may
use a false emergency as a pretext for oppressive acts, or that
social factors like race, religion, or class will influence deci-
sion makers. Racial, religious, and class bias have influence
public health responses to epidemics in many instances in our
past. We also must be concerned that the breakdown of civil
order may include a break-down of administration in many
social institutions, including the court system. The right to
challenge a quarantine in court cannot be exercised if there
are no court clerks or judges to accept writs or hear cases.1 03
The response of the Model Act's drafters to these problems is that
states ought to develop contingency plans and conduct training to pre-
pare for such emergencies. They write: "[i]n this sense, the Model
Act also attempts to promote the protection of civil liberties by requir-
ing planning and training for a public health emergency."' 0 4 How-
ever, the Act itself does not actually mandate any training; it simply
requires the preparation of an emergency plan which may or may not
deal with the problem adequately and may or may not ever be given
vitality through training and the deployment of adequate resources.
10 5
But even if the Act does spur training and planning aimed at ensuring
the implementation of the legal procedures and guarantees the Act
provides, and even if the courts were to stay open in the event of a
declaration of a public health emergency, the question remains
whether the Act's legal procedures can play the role the Model Act
envisions for them.
The reliance upon courts to mediate the tensions between public
health and individual rights also derives in part from the AIDS epi-
demic. Although courts reviewed public health actions prior to HIV,
the AIDS epidemic was certainly the first fully litigated public health
crisis. Space here precludes a full discussion of the important role
that courts played in the HIV epidemic, but there can be no doubt that
they played a critical role in signaling the inappropriateness of dis-
103 Gostin et al., supra note 25, at 627.
104 id.
105 See MODEL ACT, supra note 3, at §§ 202(a)(1)-(15) (listing the compo-
nents of such an emergency plan).
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crimination against people who are HIV positive. 0 6 Indeed, looking
at the role that courts played during the HIV epidemic, Professor
Gostin was able to write confidently about the courts' insistence that
infringements on civil liberties can be undertaken only after careful
consideration and when no less restrictive alternative is available.' °7
This substantive standard has been incorporated, with modification,
into the Model Act.
10 8
Without denying the critical role legal standards and judicial
process played with respect to HIV, there are serious reasons to exam-
ine whether they can be expected to play as constructive a role in the
event of a bioterrorist event. Indeed, it may be that the judiciary's
initial response to HIV, not public health's rejection of coercion, is
what made AIDS policy truly exceptional. In other times, judges
have been far less apt to protect the rights of individuals subject to
public health orders.
0 9
Generally limitations on individual liberty made in the name of
public health are imposed by public health officials. In the case of
HIV, in contrast, limitations upon an individual's freedom, or dis-
crimination, usually came not from a public health official, but from a
private citizen or another governmental agency not charged with or
particularly expert in public health."10 In those cases, more often than
not, public health officials sided with the individual and argued that
the restriction upon the individual's rights would not advance any
public health goal."' Thus when the courts in those cases safe-
106 See, e.g., Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 641 (1998) (ruling in favor of
a plaintiff seeking anti-discrimination protection on the basis of disability under the
ADA due to her HIV infection).
107 Lawrence 0. Gostin, Public Health Theory and Practice in the Constitu-
tional Design, 11 HEALTH MATRIX 265, 306-08 (2001).
108 More specifically the Model Act uses the language of "least restrictive
means" to limit the methods of isolation employed, not the actually determination of
whether or not isolation or quarantine is required. Sec. 604(b)(1) states:
Isolation and quarantine must be by the least restrictive means necessary to
prevent the spread of a contagious or possibly contagious disease to others
and may include, but are not limited to, confinement to private homes or
other private and public premises.
When reviewing whether to grant a petition to isolate or quarantine an individual, the
Model Act requires that the court determine whether the isolation or quarantine is
"reasonably necessary" to prevent or limit the transmission of a contagious disease.
Id. at § 605(b)(5).
109 Gostin, supra note 107, at 295.
110 Thus several school boards voted to exclude children who were HIV posi-
tive. See Parmet & Jackson, supra note 57, at 16-20 (discussing various courts'
treatment of school boards' discrimination against HIV positive students).
111 See Wendy E. Parmet, The Supreme Court Confronts HIV: Reflections on
Bragdon v. Abbott, 26 J.L. MED. & ETHics, 225, 226 (1998) (changing the role of
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guarded individual rights, they did it in a context in which public
health authorities supported those rights. We cannot derive from
those cases the lesson that courts can be trusted to engage in a mean-
ingful review of public health powers, especially when those powers
are exercised during an emergency.
Reliance on the HIV cases for faith in the ability of courts to serve
as a check on misuse of authority may be misplaced for another rea-
son. Times have changed. In the early years of the HIV epidemic,
plaintiffs were almost always successful when they used disability
discrimination laws to challenge discrimination based upon HIV
status. This trend reached its zenith in 1998 in Bragdon v. Abbott, in
which the Supreme Court held that the Americans with Disabilities
Act may be used by a woman who was HIV positive but not overtly
symptomatic with the disease.' 12 Since then, however, the Supreme
Court has consistently narrowed its interpretation of the definition of
disability under the ADA, making it ever harder for plaintiffs to dem-
onstrate that they are "in the protected class."' 13 Perhaps even more
relevant is the fact that the Court has shown an increasing willingness
to defer to the decisions of regulators and even employers who have
concluded that individuals with disabilities pose a health threat to
themselves or others."14 While these cases would not be directly rele-
vant to the question of how courts would review any exercise of coer-
cive powers under the Model Act (although they would be relevant if
an individual challenged the Model Act for its failure to adhere to the
ADA)1 5 they should provide reason to question whether courts can be
public health from restricting to protecting individual rights).
112 524 U.S. at 641.
113 See also Matthew Diller, Judicial Backlash, the ADA, and the Civil Rights
Model, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 19, 22 (2000) (noting recent decisions that
narrow the approach to interpreting the ADA). E.g., Toyota Motor Mfg., KY., Inc. v.
Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 198 (2002) (holding that to "be substantially limited in per-
forming manual tasks, an individual must have an impairment that prevents or se-
verely restricts the individual from doing activities that are of central importance to
most people's daily lives. The impairment's impact must also be permanent or long
term"); Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999).
114 See Chevron U.S.A., Inc., v. Echazabal, 
__ U.S. _, 122 S. Ct. 2045,
2047 (2002) (supporting the idea that the ADA allows employers not to hire disabled
individuals if the employer believes the individual will be harmed); Albertson's Inc.
v. Kirkinburg, 527 U.S. 555, 558 (1999); Bagenstos, supra note 61, at 1479-80 (de-
scribing the latitude given to employers and professionals by the Court when they
believe disabled individuals pose safety risks).
115 An individual's ability to do so may be thwarted by the Supreme Court's
ruling in Bd. of Trustees v. Garret, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (holding that sovereign im-
munity bars claims against state entities under Title I of the ADA).
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relied upon to engage in a meaningful assessment of risk during the
due process proceedings called for under the Model Act.
116
The Act's faith in procedural due process hearings should be
questioned for another reason. In recent years, the federal courts have
imposed numerous procedural hurdles that make it very difficult for
individuals to bring due process or constitutional claims, especially
against states, who now enjoy broad sovereign immunity from federal
constitutional claims. 1 7 Moreover, while the federal courts have not
disclaimed key earlier precedents establishing the right to a hearing
before civil commitment, 18 recent cases have demonstrated a willing-
ness to limit to some extent the sweep of procedural protections,
119
116 See Lawrence 0. Gostin, Impact of the ADA on the Health Care System, in
IMPLEMENTING THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 175, 183-84 (Lawrence 0.
Gostin & Henry A. Beyer eds., 1993) (indeed, Professor Gostin has longed looked to
disability law and the courts' jurisprudence there as to when individuals with disabili-
ties create a "direct threat" to the health or safety of others as a model to be applied in
public health law generally). There is little doubt that this jurisprudence has influ-
enced the Model Act and is, to some extent, part of the "modem" legal standards
imported into the Act. Recent case law under the ADA, however, should give pause
as to whether these standards are as protective of individual interests as was once
thought, and whether judges acting under the hurried procedures called for under the
Model Act are more likely to engage in a dispassionate review than are federal judges
presented with the luxury of full and unhurried review in ADA cases. Of course,
isolation orders and quarantines under the Model Act will be reviewed by state as
opposed to federal judges, and it may well be that they will be less deferential to those
seeking to limit the rights of people who are claimed to be a threat to others than has
been true in federal, ADA cases.
117 This is not relevant to the question of whether a due process hearing would
be available under the Model Act, but it does suggest that the judiciary in general is
less amenable to due process type claims today than it was twenty years ago. More-
over, sovereign immunity would present a problem if an individual sought to chal-
lenge the Model Act in federal court. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Against Sovereign
Immunity, 53 STAN. L. REv. 1201, 1202-03, 1215-16 (2001) (noting that the Court has
not indicated a willingness to relax to relax federal sovereign immunity). And the
Model Act itself imposes its own brand of sovereign immunity. MODEL ACT, supra
note 3, at § 804.
11 For a list of critical early cases see Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 491
(1980) (holding that transfer of a prisoner to a mental hospital requires a hearing
before an independent decision maker); Addington v. Texas, 411 U.S. 418, 425
(1979) (discussing the need for due process protection in civil commitments); and
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (emphasizing the idea that due proc-
ess requires the right to be heard).
119 See Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 322 (1993) (analyzed under the Equal
Protection Clause, permitting a lesser standard of proof for the commitment of men-
tally retarded individuals than is applied to cases involving the commitment of men-
tally ill individuals); United States v. Sahhar, 917 F.2d 1197, 1205-06 (9 1h Cir. 1990)
(holding that a jury is not required for civil commitment under 18 U.S.C. 4246);
United States v. Baker, 45 F.3d 837 (4h Cir. 1995) ( use of video conferencing does
not violate procedural due process rights of an inmate subject to civil commitment).
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and some Supreme Court justices have even questioned whether a
constitutional claim may be brought when an individual was denied a
hearing prior to a civil commitment.1 20 To the extent that these cases
limit an individual's right to due process, the Model Act should be
credited with possibly granting individuals even more procedural pro-
tections than they are ensured under the Constitution. However, the
courts' attitude toward recent procedural due process cases should
again raise qualms about the usefulness and impact of such hearings.
Courts that are so confident that public officials will "do the right
thing" that they do not believe it is necessary to provide a strong de-
gree of procedural protections are not likely to engage in a very rigor-
ous review when hearings actually occur.'
2 1
This is not to say that access to the courts is not crucial. It re-
mains the indelible core of the rule of law. But we should question
whether the due process/anti-discrimination model of legal rights, that
relies so heavily upon individual hearings and individual claims be-
fore courts, that emerged from the HIV epidemic, can be counted on
in the future to play the critical role that it played with respect to HIV.
V. RETHINKING THE ROLE OF QUARANTINE AND
ISOLATION
There is no magic bullet for bioterrorism, just as there isn't one
for most public health threats. Unfortunately, protection of the public
health usually requires a complex array of strategies, from public edu-
cation to surveillance, from vaccine development to market controls.
Most or all of them will involve law. Only a few of them will require
the curtailment of individual liberties.
The sponsors and drafters of the Model Act are acutely aware of
the need for a sophisticated, multi-prong approach to bioterrorism.
They have never advocated that restrictions on individual rights
should play the sole or even leading role in that struggle. Instead they
rightly see the Model Act and the coercive powers it would provide as
but a single element in a multi-tiered process. And, they have at-
tempted to construct that process while providing for significant judi-
cial protections for individual rights.
120 E.g., Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113 (1990) (O'Connor, J. dissenting
joined by Rehnquist, C.J., Scalia, J., and Kennedy, J.) (arguing that the state's failure
to follow own procedures and permit an involuntary commitment to a mental hospital
without a hearing is not unconstitutional).
121 Of course, again, the hearings under the Model Act will occur in state not
federal court. On the other hand, they will occur in an emergency, which is not gen-
erally the case in the procedural due process context.
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Nevertheless, there is a danger that the dissemination of the
Model Act may be construed by political leaders and others as "solv-
ing" the problem of legal preparedness. Today when our public health
infrastructure is sorely tattered, 122 and when "solutions" seem hard to
envision, the clarification of coercive powers may provide an easy and
relatively inexpensive fix.
123
The danger brought by such a balm is not merely the illusion of
false comfort. It is the potential for distraction and misdirection of
priorities. By focusing on how we can update the law to do a better
job of isolating and quarantining individuals, or vaccinating them
without their consent, we risk overlooking the other ways that we can
and should use law proactively to help prevent and prepare for bioter-
rorism.
One obvious candidate for legal attention is the international de-
velopment and transport of dangerous pathogens and other ingredients
of biological weapons. Last year, a few weeks after the unveiling of
the Model Act, the Bush administration announced its rejection of
international talks aimed at strengthening the 1972 Biological Weap-
ons Convention. 124 More recently, the Administration has stated that
it is abandoning efforts to strengthen the Convention. 125 While a full
analysis of that particular international effort is beyond the purview of
this paper, the point remains that there is a critical need for legal ef-
forts to curtail the creation and shipment of biological weapons.
Emergency powers designed to contain a bioterrorist outbreak by iso-
lating individuals can never be a substitute for legal efforts designed
to prevent one in the first place.
Domestically, last spring's Public Health Security and Bioterror-
ism Preparedness and Response Act ("PHSBPRA") undertook many
important steps, greatly increasing federal funding for state and local
preparedness and tightening the regulation of laboratories that use
122 COMMITTEE FOR THE STUDY OF THE FUTURE OF PUBLIC HEALTH, THE
FUTURE OF PUBLIC HEALTH 73-106 (1988).
123 For example, last fall Governor Jane Swift of Massachusetts supported the
Model Act and promised to push for its passage in her state. Justin Gills, States
Weighing Laws to Fight Bioterrorism, THE WASH. POST, November 19, 2001, at AOl.
Only a few days later the state passed a budget that slashed public health programs
and the Governor vetoed part of that program, imposing further cuts on public health.
See Rick Klein, Legislators are Likely to Restore Social Funding, BOSTON GLOBE,
Dec. 5, 2001, at B-4.
124 Steven Erlanger, Bush's Move on ABM Pact Gives Pause to Europeans,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2001, at A-19.
125 Peter Slevin, U.S. Drops Bid to Strengthen Germ Warfare Accord, WASH.
POST, Sept. 19, 2002, at A01.
2003]
HEAL TH M TRIX
dangerous pathogens. 126 Nevertheless, if we focus upon law's ability
to regulate and structure markets, as opposed to its ability to restrain
individuals, gaps appear. For example, although the PHSBPRA gives
the Secretary of Agriculture authority to expand the capacity of the
Food Inspection Service to protect against bioterrorism, the Act does
not provide anything close to a comprehensive approach for inspec-
tion and protection of the food supply. In a recent report, 127 the Na-
tional Academy of Science warned that inadequate attention has been
given to this issue and the nation remains vulnerable to a bioterrorist
attack on the food supply. 128 Likewise, the PHSBPRA does not re-
quire states to rebuild their broken public health systems to ensure the
"dual-use' capacity that is so clearly needed.129 While the PHSBPRA
authorizes grants to help states address bioterrorism, 130 the danger
remains that states will remain unprepared as their public health sys-
tems as a whole remain unsupported.'
At the state level, once we move away from thinking about law as
coercion, other significant issues appear. Once again, the most obvi-
ous issue concerns resources. Laws allocate resources - and they can
also create entitlements to them. Yet, we have not considered in our
legal preparation for bioterrorism the creation of any entitlement to
the resources necessary to confront bioterrorism. Indeed, while the
Model Act would grant governors the authority to exercise emergency
powers, there is nothing in the Act to commit states to undertake the
deployment of resources that is crucial to preparing for bioterrorism.
Theoretically, a state law aiming at bioterrorism could focus not
on the state's power to mandate vaccines, but on ensuring that vac-
cines will be available and administered smoothly, when needed.
Indeed, guidelines recently released by the CDC for states to use in
preparing a response to a potential outbreak of smallpox raise a host
126 Pub. L. No. 107-188, §§ 131 et seq; 201 et seq; 301, 116 Stat. 594 (2002)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 243; 262 et seq.)
117 21 U.S.C. § 679(c) (2000).
128 National Academies, Better Plan Needed to Protect U.S. Agriculture from
Bioterror Attack, at http://www4.nationalacademies.org (Sept. 19, 2002).
129 Experts agree that preparation for bioterrorism requires an overall en-
hancement of the public health infrastructure, which should be built upon and would
expand public health's capacity to respond to naturally occurring disease outbreaks.
See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, BIOTERRORISM-FEDERAL RESEARCH AND
PREPAREDNESS ACTIVITIES, GAO-0 1-915 (September 2001), at 6. A pressing problem
today is that investments made for bioterrorism preparedness activities will not offset
cuts made elsewhere in public health budgets, thereby weakening the overall public
health infrastructure. See note 124, supra.
130 42 U.S.C. § 247d-3(a).
131 See Gostin et al., supra note 71, at 95-97 (discussing the decline in funding
and support for state public health systems).
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of important legal questions for Congress and the states to address,
many of which are unanswered by the Model Act.132 Although the
original CDC guidelines cited to and recommended the Model Act,133
and the recent additions continue to rely in part upon quarantine,'
34
their primary focus is upon the implementation of a massive, popula-
tion-wide campaign of voluntary vaccination.' 35 If such an effort is to
be carried out successfully, it will undoubtedly require a great deal of
trust and confidence on the part of the public and this may well re-
quire new and creative legal approaches. For example, the CDC's
mass vaccination program depends upon individuals revealing
whether they are immune suppressed, something that experience with
HIV suggests individuals may be far more likely to do if they feel
comfortable knowing that the information will be kept confidential
and not be used against them.' 36 As a result, states interested in facili-
tating a massive vaccination program may want to consider taking
additional steps to ensure that information conveyed in a vaccination
clinic would not be further disseminated and could not be used against
an individual (indeed, the possibility that this information might be
used to mandate isolation apart from one's family may lead people to
not be forthright at the clinics). Likewise, since a mass effort will
inevitably lead to long lines and confusion, states may want to con-
sider ensuring that individuals are protected against adverse employ-
ment (or welfare) impacts for the time lost at the clinic. States may
also want to give thought on ways to guarantee that individuals who
lack health insurance can be confident in receiving prompt care for
vaccine-related injuries. And states may want to reassure health care
workers that they will not be liable for the injuries that will inevitably
result from a massive vaccination program.137 Given the complexities
132 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Smallpox Response Plan and
Guidelines, Guide C: Isolation and Quarantine Guidelines C-14 to C-17, at
http://www.bt.cdc.gov/agent/smallpox/response-plan/files/guide-c-pages 1-1 8only.pdf
(last modified Sept. 23, 2002).
133 Id. at C-14 to C-15.
134 See Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Smallpox Response Plan
and Guidelines; Annex 3: Smallpox Vaccination Clinic Guide, A3-31, 37, at
http://www.bt.cdc.gov/agent/smallpox/response-plan/files/annex-3.pdf (last modified
Sept. 23, 2002) (providing guidelines for isolating patients).
131 Id. at A3-3, at http://www.bt.cdc.gov/agent/smallpox/response-
plan/files/annex-3.pdf (last modified Sept. 23, 2002).
136 The guidelines call for different treatment for individuals depending upon
their immune status. Id. at A3-29.
137 See Katharine C. Rathbun & Edward P. Richards, Federal Smallpox Im-
munization Policy-A Short Critique, available at
http://biotech.law.lsu.edu/blaw/bt/smallpox/Critique01.htm (Sept. 26, 2002) (noting
that, "[g]iven the probable level of vaccine complications, litigation would cripple the
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and challenges of such a massive program, there is more than enough
legal work to be done without thinking about the powers to coerce
individuals. Indeed, in such circumstances, a focus upon coercion
may well serve to undermine the trust of the public.
Likewise, in developing quarantine strategies, a state may want to
go beyond enhancing its powers to impose detention orders and pro-
viding legal process for those who are detained involuntarily. Instead,
a state may want to give thought to how voluntary quarantine and/or
isolation recommendations may be more tolerable and acceptable to
the population. In other words, the state may want to think about how
it can promote voluntary compliance. After all, the state will never
have sufficient resources to "round up" and involuntarily detail large
numbers of people. But in order to obtain voluntary compliance,
states may need to move beyond a police power model, and think not
only about how they can enforce laws and protect legal rights of those
detained, but also how they can make quarantine less frightening and
more palatable. The Model Act moves in that direction by requiring
that states provide for the needs of those involuntarily detained, but as
noted above, it does not specifically address the economic conse-
quences of quarantine, nor does it ensure that dependents will be care
for.1 38 In addition, the Model Act does not provide for the care or
compensation of individuals who stay put without the imposition of a
public health order. But, if quarantine is critical to the public good,
then perhaps like jury duty or reserve duty, those who serve (voluntar-
ily or involuntarily) should be provided with job protection and com-
pensation.
In preparing for bioterrorism, a state may also want to consider
ways that law can be used to ensure that health care facilities will
have the needed surge capacity. While the Model Act gives the states
power to impound facilities during an emergency, 3 9 it does not con-
sider the complex and difficult issue of how state health care licensing
and financing regulations affect the number of beds and personnel on
hand in the state. Yet, if law is to be used to prepare for and against
bioterrorism, these issues must be part of the preparation.
Finally, once we turn our eyes to structural approaches we may
discover that they also offer some promise not only for protection
against bioterrorism but for the protection of individual rights and
liberties in the event an emergency occurs. The Model Act relies
heavily upon the courts and the protections offered by individual hear-
public health system").
138 MODEL ACT, supra note 3, at § 604(b)(6).
131 id at § 502(b).
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ings. But in times of crisis, this approach has seldom proven success-
ful.
The political theory of our founding fathers offered a different,
structural approach. The Constitution relies primarily not upon judi-
cial review or due process hearings, but the division of power and
checks and balances in order to thwart tyranny. As James Madison
famously said, "ambition must be made to counteract ambition."'
40
So, too, as we prepare for bioterrorism, we need to think long and
hard about the structures of government, and how they can be most
effectively utilized both to invigorate the public sector to prevent and
respond to bioterrorism and to prevent the misuse of such powers.
That may mean rethinking the boundaries of federalism and develop-
ing legal theories to provide the federal government with the power it
may need to address problems national in scope as well as limits upon
it to prevent an erosion of legitimate state interests.' 41 At the state
level, it may mean thinking carefully about the relationship between
governors, state health departments, local health departments, and
legislators. To give one example, while it seems obvious that gover-
nors may need the power to act quickly in the event of a catastrophe,
the Model Act's decision to prevent state legislatures from repealing
any declaration of an emergency for thirty days may unnecessarily
remove a structural and political check upon the misuse of authority, a
check that might well do more to curtail unnecessary limitations upon
individual rights than would due process hearings. Likewise, the
Act's reliance on the governor alone, without the necessity of consul-
tation by the public health department, or municipal leaders, again
appears to vest authority in a single source, negating the possibility
that multiple centers of power (what we use to call "checks and bal-
ances"), may offer the best opportunity to define and preserve the
common good, without unduly disadvantaging minority groups.
When health threats appear, as in times of war, there is an inevita-
ble tendency to focus on the need for efficient power and the virtues
of a powerful executive. But just as our framers taught us that the
preservation of peace requires a far more complex and less tidy politi-
cal state than is needed to win a war, so too, we may recall that the
protection of public health whether from bioterrorism or natural
causes ultimately requires complex and multifaceted laws. There is a
lot of work for lawyers yet to do.
140 THE FEDERALIST PAPERS No. 51, at 319 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick
ed., 1987).
141 See Annas, supra note 25 at 1337, 1341; Parmet, supra note 83, at 207-08.
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